This paper presents a one-year study of Internet packet traffic from a large campus network, showing that 15-25% of TCP connections have at least one TCP RST (reset). Similar results have also been observed from measurements of other Internet links. The results in this paper show that reset connections arise from local events such as network outages, attacks, or reconfigurations, as well as from global trends in TCP usage. In particular, we identify applicationlevel Web behaviour as the primary contributor to the global trend in reset TCP connections. The most prevalent anomaly is the absence of the normal connection termination handshake. Instead, connections are often reset by the client. We believe that particular implementations of HTTP/TCP connection management cause this global trend.
INTRODUCTION
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a connectionoriented transport-layer protocol that provides reliable bytestream delivery between two hosts on a network [12] . TCP is the dominant transport-layer protocol on the Internet today, carrying more than 90% of all data traversing backbone links [5, 13, 14] .
A normal TCP connection passes through several distinct states, from the connection establishment phase to connection termination. All TCP implementations should follow this behaviour, to ensure reliable data transfer to any other TCP-enabled host on the network.
Recent Internet traffic measurements suggest that many TCP connections are not following the rules. For example, in a recent study of Internet-bound traffic from a large campus network, 20-80% of TCP connections observed are abnormal, in that they experience at least one TCP reset. Similar results were observed in our measurements of backbone links operated by a commercial network service provider. This phenomenon has been observed on other networks as well, including Lawrence Berkeley Labs (LBL) [9] .
In this paper we show how local events and global trends are responsible for this behaviour. One of the global trends is the absence of the normal handshake for closing a connection. Instead, many connections are reset by the client (i.e., the originator of the connection), and others by the server (i.e., the responder). While there are many possible reasons for this, including user behaviours, erroneous TCP implementations, and misbehaving network devices, evidence suggests that network applications (e.g., Web browsers) are the real cause.
Our goal in this paper is to identify the different causes of abnormal TCP connections, quantify their frequency of occurrence, and determine whether they are intentional or unintentional.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on TCP and the terminology used in this paper. Section 3 describes the experimental methodology for our measurements. Section 4 presents the results from our study. Section 5 discusses implications of our work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
TCP BACKGROUND
TCP is a connection-oriented, end-to-end reliable-byte-stream transport-layer protocol [11, 12] . It is widely used on the Internet and in the Web. This section defines TCP terminology relevant for understanding this paper. More detail on HTTP TCP behaviour appears in [2] .
The fundamental unit of data transfer in TCP is a byte (i.e., for sequence numbering, flow control, and error control purposes). However, TCP implementations generally work with a larger logical unit size called a segment when transmitting packets across an IP internetwork. The Maximum Segment Size (MSS) is a tunable parameter for a TCP transfer. The choice of the MSS typically depends on the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size supported by the underlying network layer. In most instances, each TCP segment is carried in one IP packet; hence we use the terms segment and packet interchangeably throughout the paper.
The task of TCP is to divide the application-layer data into one or more segments, transmit them across the network, and deliver them reliably (and in order) to the receiving TCP. Each segment carries an explicit sequence number, for the purposes of ordering and reliability.
TCP uses a three-way handshake for reliable connection management. The opening handshake uses the synchronize (SYN) flag bit in the TCP packet header. The purpose of this handshake is to ensure that the other endpoint exists and is willing to establish a connection, and that the request is genuine (i.e., not a delayed duplicate, or a replay attack). During this handshake, the two endpoints establish the starting sequence numbers for data transfers in each direction, set connection parameters (e.g., MSS), and negotiate desired options (e.g., timestamps, SACK, or the window scale option for high bandwidth-delay product networks).
The closing handshake uses the finish (FIN) flag bit in the TCP packet header. The purpose of this handshake is to ensure that each endpoint has received, delivered, and acknowledged all application-layer data that was sent while the connection was open. Either endpoint can initiate the close of the connection. Once each endpoint has sent a FIN and acknowledged the other endpoint's FIN, the connection is marked as CLOSED. The connection record then remains in a TIME WAIT state for a few minutes before being recycled for use as another TCP connection state record.
The reset (RST) bit in the TCP packet header is used to signal error conditions detected by TCP. RFC 793 states that "As a general rule, reset (RST) must be sent whenever a segment arrives which apparently is not intended for the current connection. A reset must not be sent if it is not clear that this is the case." [11] . Scenarios where a reset must be sent include the arrival of a data packet for which no connection is open, the arrival of a TCP segment with an inappropriate sequence number, or the arrival of a SYN ACK packet for which no SYN had been initiated.
Our recent measurements indicate that a disproportionately large number of TCP connections experience TCP resets. Our measurement experiments seek the cause(s) of this anomalous behaviour.
EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
There are two main parts to our study: passive measurements from a campus network, and active measurements with different client and server platforms. This section describes the methodology for each part of the study.
Passive Measurements
The primary data set in our paper comes from passive network traffic measurements of the campus network at the University of Calgary. In cooperation with staff from University of Calgary Information Technologies (UCIT), the administrators of the campus network, we installed a network monitoring machine at the main campus router.
The monitoring machine is a dual-processor Dell (two 1.4 GHz Pentium III processors) with 2 GB RAM and 140 GB of disk. The campus network backbone is currently connected to the commercial Internet via a 100 Mb/s full-duplex Ethernet link. The traffic on that network link is forwarded (via port mirroring) to our monitor via a 1 Gb/s half-duplex Ethernet link.
We use tcpdump 1 for our network measurements. It allows collection of TCP/IP packet headers, and (optionally) packet payloads as well. Since one of our objectives is a longitudinal study of network traffic, we record only selected packets (i.e., SYN, FIN, RST) from each TCP connection, to reduce the volume of data collected. While this (widely used) data collection technique precludes certain types of per-packet analyses, it still enables many interesting connection-level and behavioural analyses [10] .
For the primary measurements in this paper, we configured tcpdump to collect all TCP SYNs, FINs, and RSTs traversing the University's commercial Internet backbone link. These packets are recorded to a file, with a new file created for each 1 hour of network traffic. The recorded files are then moved off the monitoring machine to an analysis machine. The files are processed (in timestamp order) using Bro 2 . Bro was originally designed for network intrusion detection, and thus is a very powerful tool for analyzing network traffic. We have written a number of scripts in Bro's scripting language which we use to specify our analyses. 
Active Measurements
The passive measurements identified a large number of reset TCP connections on the campus network. Further investigation (described in Section 4.1) identified that many of these reset connections were for Web transactions. Because of this anomaly, we conducted isolated tests with several different Web browsers, Web servers, and operating systems in an attempt to discern the sources of the TCP resets.
These tests used active measurement techniques to initiate HTTP/TCP connections from a client to a server. The tcpdump software was run simultaneously on the network to record packet traces of the resulting activity. Table 1 summarizes the software configurations used in our manual testing of Web clients and Web servers. According to a Netcraft survey [7] in October 2004, the four most preva-lent Web servers on the Internet are Apache (67.92%), Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) (21.09%), SunONE (3.04%), and Zeus (1.35%). All four of these are tested in our study.
On the client side, we initiate HTTP connections in two different ways: from a browser (e.g., Mozilla, Internet Explorer), and from the command line using telnet to port 80 on the server. The use of these two techniques allows us to assess application-layer HTTP/TCP behaviour separately from the TCP protocol stack embedded in the operating system kernel. We consider one version of Linux (RedHat 9.0), and one version of Windows (Windows 2000).
The active measurement results appear in Section 4.2. Several observations are evident from Figure 1 . First, the number of TCP connections sampled in our study is on the order of tens of millions per day, large enough to provide reasonable estimates of the TCP connection states on which we focus. Second, a significant fraction of the TCP connections, approximately 35%, are for HTTP (Web) traffic. Third, the HTTP proportion of the total TCP traffic is relatively consistent across the one-year period studied. There are noticeable weekly patterns, and longer-term trends consistent with the academic calendar. These behaviours are very pronounced in the HTTP data, since most Web traffic is human-initiated. The patterns are less pronounced in the TCP data, since many TCP connections are machinegenerated. Figure 1 shows that there are three obvious anomalies in this data set. The first occurred February 27, 2004. A brief power outage corrupted the file system on our monitor, which had to be manually repaired. The second occurred in mid-May, and the third on July 10, 2004. Both of these involved machine-generated (local) events. We provide more details on these two events later in the paper. The next step in our analysis was to classify each observed TCP connection based on the state reported by Bro. This state indicates whether the connection was "normal" or "abnormal". Among the abnormal states, Bro classifies each connection according to the packet patterns observed. Table 2 provides a description of the most relevant TCP connection states. A "normal" TCP connection has a proper SYN handshake and FIN handshake (SYN/FIN). Abnormal connections can take many possible states. The most common of these abnormal states are reject (REJ), reset by originator (RSTO), and reset by responder (RSTR). Figure 2 shows the results from classifying all of the TCP connections from our measurement data. The graph shows the daily percentages observed for each of the five most prevalent TCP connection states. The name of each state appears to the right of its associated band in the graph. Figure 2 shows that the "normal" SYN/FIN case (middle of the graph) is the most common state observed in the overall TCP traffic. However, the SYN/FIN percentage is a lot lower than expected: it ranges between 20% and 60%, with an overall average of about 40%.
RESULTS

Passive Measurements
The S0 (SYN only) and REJ (reject) states combined are the next most common. These are the bottom two bands in Figure 2 . These values are inflated due to several local events. We would not expect similarly high percentages of S0 and REJ states to occur globally, although other sites could experience similar phenomena. As a result, we provide a more detailed explanation of these local events below.
Between
Unfortunately numerous external clients of one particular service were apparently unaware of this change, and as a result, continuously attempted to establish a TCP connection to a now closed port on the old server. On December 19, 2003, in an attempt to stop this traffic, a router on the campus network was configured to drop these SYN packets before they reached the old server. As a result, Figure 2 shows a dramatic drop in the REJ connections, and a corresponding increase in the S0 connections (as our monitor still saw the incoming SYN packets).
In mid May and again on July 10, there were significant spikes in the percentage of TCP connections in the S0 state. The spikes in mid May were caused by a single client trying to reach a non-existent Web server. The rate at which these connection requests were issued indicates that the underlying HTTP requests were not human-generated. The large spike in July was an attempted scan of a single machine.
Even if these local events are ignored, there are still many connections with S0 or REJ states. We attribute much of this to hosts scanning other hosts or networks, and expect that this is a global trend. There are likely other local events hidden within Figure 2 , since the percentage of S0 connections is currently much higher than it was a year ago. However, we defer a more detailed analysis of these states for future work.
The next two most common TCP states are RSTO and RSTR. These correspond to connections that actually transferred data between the client and server (in one or both directions), but that were then reset by either the client (RSTO) or the server (RSTR), rather than terminated with a FIN handshake. Figure 2 shows that approximately 15% of TCP connections fall into one of these two categories. These percentages are relatively stable throughout the trace, suggesting this is likely a global trend. nections (a subset of the total TCP activity). The normal SYN/FIN state is the most prevalent, accounting for approximately 70% of all HTTP connections throughout the year. The percentages are quite stable, with the exception of the anomaly in May mentioned earlier. Figure 3 shows that the local anomaly persisted much longer than was evident in Figure 2 . With the exception of this anomaly, the proportion of REJ and S0 states has dropped significantly, suggesting that most of the failed connection attempts in the overall TCP traffic are not HTTP-related.
The main observation in Figure 3 is that the proportion of TCP RST states has increased significantly, particularly for resets by the originating client. Across the entire duration of the trace, the RSTO state accounted for about 22% of the HTTP TCP traffic, while the RSTR state averaged around 3%. These behaviours occur consistently, on a daily basis, suggesting that they are a stable part of the Internet traffic.
Active Measurements
In an attempt to pinpoint the sources of the TCP reset behaviours, we manually conducted isolated experiments with selected Web client and Web browser software. Using tcpdump packet traces, we then classified the connection state that resulted from each test scenario.
The first set of tests involved remote Web servers hosting commercial Web sites. Since we want to evaluate characteristics of the server implementations rather than the specific configurations of sites, we chose to test the Apache, Microsoft, Zeus, and Sun Web sites. We expect that these sites all run a recent version of their corresponding Web server software, and are configured to exploit all of the features of that software. Each of these sites supports persistent connections. We expect that each server has a management procedure to close idle TCP connections. The most common management approaches are likely timeout-based (e.g., close a connection if it has been idle for more than N seconds) and threshold-based (e.g., if more than X persistent connections are open, then close the connection that has been idle the longest).
To study the TCP connection behaviour, we telnet to port 80 on each server and issue an HTTP request, and keep the connection open. From tcpdump, we can see how the server closes the connection. Note that we are only interested in the TCP behaviour when the connection is closed, not in determining the management policy (e.g., timeout, threshold) in use by the server. (The aggressiveness of connection closing likely depends on Web workload and TCP resource usage, both at the server and the client.) We also initiate requests from common Web browser platforms to see if there are any differences in TCP behaviour. The results in Table 3 illustrate two main points. First, among the four different Web servers tested, three used the proper FIN handshake to terminate an idle persistent connection, while one (Microsoft IIS) used a TCP RST. This type of server behaviour is likely responsible for many of the responder RSTs (RSTR) observed in the campus TCP traffic. This feature of IIS is used to reduce the number of connections that enter the TIME WAIT state on the server [8] .
Second, one of the client browsers tested (Microsoft Internet Explorer on Windows 2000) used TCP RST to terminate connections. The Internet Explorer (IE) browser on Windows 2000 consistently used TCP RSTs to close persistent connections, regardless of the server with which it was communicating. Since telnet on Windows 2000 also used the proper FIN handshake to close TCP connections, we expect that the version of IE 6.0 we are using on Windows 2000 is shutting down the connection in a non-graceful manner [6] .
Given the widespread use of Internet Explorer, and its apparent non-standard use of TCP for some versions (we previously observed similar behaviour with IE 5.5 on Windows 2000), we hypothesize that it accounts for the bulk of the RSTO states in our traffic measurements.
A second set of tests was conducted with a local Web client and a local Web server, to demonstrate that the foregoing behaviours are repeatable. By using a local Web server (Apache 1.3.27), we can control the server configuration, including the server mechanisms (e.g., timeout setting) for closing persistent connections.
The results from the local tests were consistent with those observed with the remote Web servers. In addition, the local tests showed that IE closes idle connections after 60 seconds, if resource demands do not require reclaiming connections sooner. In all tests, Mozilla closes TCP connections properly (SYN/FIN), as did telnet on Linux and Windows.
In the tests reported here, the browsers do not have a large number of persistent connections open at one time. In actual usage, browsers may need to close persistent connections more aggressively (e.g., if a client visits a new site different from what they are currently viewing). We have observed cases where IE does in fact close connections more aggressively. Again, it used TCP RSTs rather than FINs. IE also used RSTs to close connections that were still open when the user exited the browser application. Mozilla used FINs to handle this case.
Browser-Level Analysis
To close our measurement study, we present in Table 4 a more detailed breakdown by browser type of the TCP connection states observed for clients visiting our campus web server. We use a trace involving a single server so that we can focus on the behaviour of the browsers.
We used Bro to analyze the relationship between the browser used (indicated by the HTTP User-Agent request header) and the TCP connection state. Table 4 shows the ten most common user-agents in the trace. nections, 36% ended with the proper FIN handshake, while 60% were reset by the client. Table 4 shows that all of the IE browsers had roughly similar behaviour. The single Gecko browser on the list, as well as the "Crawlers" group typically used the FIN handshake to terminate their connections. This suggests that there is not a problem with the server.
The percentage of reset connections seen in this trace is higher than what we have seen in the overall network trace. We believe that this is primarily due to the aggressive closing of persistent connections by the server. The particular server that we monitored actively closed connections if they were idle for a mere two seconds. On connections using IE as the browser, the client typically responded with a RST, rather than completing the FIN handshake.
The aggressive closing of persistent connections is also responsible for some of the RSTR connections. The shorter the idle timeout, the greater the probability that another request from the client is in transit when the server sends its FIN packet to initiate the active closing of the connection. If a request arrives after the server has sent a FIN packet, the server issues a RST, resulting in a RSTR state for that connection.
One possible reason that a browser may reset a connection (other than to abort a transfer when a problem has occurred) is to reduce the number of TIME WAIT states on the server [8] . However, it is in the client's best interest to ensure that a connection does not get reused too quickly (the role of TIME WAIT). Specifically, when problems occur with TCP connections, the user's Web browsing experience is degraded. A better approach for reducing TIME WAIT overhead on Web servers is for clients to be more proactive, judiciously closing server connections using the proper FIN handshake. The TIME WAIT state is then maintained at the client, rather than the server.
There is another side effect of resetting TCP connections. We have observed situations where a client has received a complete response on a connection that it reset, and then seen the client immediately request the same file again on a different connection. This not only degrades the user's Web experience, but leads to redundant transfers across the Internet.
The overhead of managing TCP connections in a TIME WAIT state can be significant [1, 3] . Thus it is understandable why some servers choose to RST connections that have been idle for a long period of time. However, we believe that this should only be done if absolutely necessary (e.g., if the server is actually busy and needs to reduce its overhead), and not as a general practice.
IMPLICATIONS
Although we only describe data from one network in this paper, we believe that we have shown sufficient evidence to indicate that the increased occurrence of reset TCP connections is in fact a global trend. In Section 4.1 we showed that many of the resets occur in HTTP, and appear to be caused primarily by Web clients. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we observed that this behaviour is a property of certain browsers, and not of the underlying operating systems. In addition, we have observed similar behaviour in a commercial Internet Service Provider environment. Furthermore, other researchers have reported similar observations on the end2end mailing list 3 . To verify (or refute) our claims, others can repeat our analysis on data from other Internet environments, such as data from The Internet Archive 4 , CAIDA 5 , and NLANR 6 , or data collected from the researchers' own networks.
We argue that the practice of closing a TCP connection with a reset is anomalous, if it does not follow the guidelines outlined in the TCP specification [11] . Although we have only observed minor problems from arbitrarily resetting TCP connections 7 , our primary concern is with standards conformance. Conformance to standards is critically important for interoperability, which is a fundamental property of the Internet. We believe that protocols should be amended if important functionality is lacking (such as handling the overhead of TIME WAIT on a busy server). Ignoring protocol conformance issues could eventually lead to non-standard features that compromise the interoperability of TCP implementations, or limit the future evolution of TCP [4] .
The prevalence of reset TCP connections also has an impact on the accuracy of network traffic analysis. Many TCP measurement studies focus only on the characteristics of "successful" TCP connections (i.e., those with SYN and FIN), ignoring RSTs as an uncommon error condition. Our work suggests that this assumption can underestimate network traffic by 20% or more. Worse yet, the sequence numbers carried in RST packets are sometimes meaningless, which complicates data flow size estimation. The presence of many successful reset connections is yet another level of obfuscation that researchers must address in their attempt to understand the actual network characteristics.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes the different causes of abnormal TCP connections. Our measurement results show that applicationlevel browser behaviour is the primary contributor to the global trend of abnormal TCP behaviours. Specifically, irregularities in the implementation and management of persistent HTTP connections are the cause of this problem. Correcting the TCP behaviour of a popular Web browser would likely eliminate most of these TCP RST anomalies.
Our short-term future work involves creating more sophisticated Bro scripts to analyze the HTTP transactions more rigourously. Our longer-term plans include a longitudinal study of TCP behaviour, digging deeper into anomalies and trends that arise.
